Bidding against a Buyout: Implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value

Chaoran Sun

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2022, vol. 101, issue C

Abstract: We introduce two mechanisms that implement the Shapley value and the equal surplus value, respectively. The main feature of both mechanisms is that multiple proposers put forth allocation plans simultaneously. The implementation of a plan requires both consensus among proposers and acceptance of respondents. In case of disagreement among proposers, we use the bidding procedure introduced by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), which facilitates a buyout of one proposer in each round. Then the difference between two values comes down to how proposers negotiate with respondents.

Keywords: Coalitional games; Shapley value; Duality; Nash program; Implementation Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:101:y:2022:i:c:s0304406822000416

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102686

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