Contribution games with asymmetric agents

Zhixian Yu

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2022, vol. 102, issue C

Abstract: We generalise Admati and Perry (1991)’s two-player, alternating contributions model, allowing participants to be asymmetric from two dimensions: 1. one of the players is the deadline player and 2. players receive different rewards on completing the project. In equilibrium, the project either ends in the first few stages or at the deadline. A slight change in the environment can influence the ending time dramatically. Based on that, we discuss the appropriate rewarding distribution.

Keywords: Contribution games; Deadline effect; Value effect; Reward distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:102:y:2022:i:c:s0304406822000659

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102724

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