On constrained generalized games with action sets in non-locally-convex and non-Hausdorff topological vector spaces

M. Khan, Richard McLean and Metin Uyanık

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2024, vol. 111, issue C

Abstract: This paper presents results on the existence of an equilibrium in the context of a typology consisting of qualitative, generalized and constrained generalized normal form games with the following features: (i) a set of players of arbitrary cardinality, (ii) action sets that may be non-compact subsets of a non-Hausdorff and non-locally convex space, (iii) individual preferences satisfying a weakened continuity postulate with origins in the literature on discontinuous strategic-form games. It reports four theorems and seven corollaries, and thereby brings together lines of work in game theory, Walrasian general equilibrium theory and applied mathematics in a synthetic overview that revolves around Browder’s fixed point theorem.

Keywords: Qualitative game; Constrained generalized game; Noncompact; Non-Hausdorff; Non-locally-convex; Weak local intersection property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:111:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824000260

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102964

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