The reciprocity set

Roland Pongou and Jean-Baptiste Tondji

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2024, vol. 112, issue C

Abstract: We consider the problem of designing procedures that guarantee policy stability, efficiency, and inclusiveness. For this purpose, we introduce a sequential protocol that embeds clauses granting agents the right to oppose actions not in their interest, retract actions that face opposition, and punish harmful actions. Our analysis shows that coalitional farsighted behaviors under this procedure lead to reciprocal actions. We then introduce a solution concept–the reciprocity set–to predict stable outcomes for effectivity function games. We find that under some conditions, the reciprocity set (1) is always non-empty; (2) only selects efficient outcomes; (3) strategically protects minority outcomes; and (4) is compatible with classical notions of fairness and Rawlsian justice in distributive problems.

Keywords: Reciprocity; Policy Stability; Pareto-efficiency; Inclusiveness; Minority; Reciprocity Set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:112:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824000429

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102980

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