Robust α-maxmin representations

Alain Chateauneuf, Xiangyu Qu, Caroline Ventura and Vassili Vergopoulos

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2024, vol. 114, issue C

Abstract: The class of α-maxmin representations of an agent’s preferences is meant to achieve a separation between the ambiguity he perceives and his attitude toward this perceived ambiguity. Yet the same preferences may admit a multiplicity of α-maxmin representations that contradict each other. We say that an α-maxmin representation is robust when no other α-maxmin representation exists for the same preferences. We obtain a full characterization of robustness for maxmin representation. In the case of general α-maxmin representations, we obtain sufficient conditions for both robustness and non-robustness. This contributes to better identification of the α-maxmin representations that admit a robust interpretation in terms of perceived ambiguity and ambiguity attitudes.

Keywords: α-maxmin; Robustness; Agent’s preferences; Ambiguity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:114:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824001058

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103045

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