Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game

Yaron Azrieli

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2010, vol. 46, issue 3, 303-310

Abstract: We consider a random-matching model in which every agent has a categorization (partition) of his potential opponents. In equilibrium, the strategy of each player i is a best response to the distribution of strategies of his opponents (when they face i) in each category of his categorization. We provide equivalence theorems between distributions generated by equilibrium profiles and correlated equilibria of the underlying game.

Keywords: Random-matching; Categorization; Correlated; equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:3:p:303-310

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