On refutability of the Nash bargaining solution

Andrés Carvajal and Natalia González

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2014, vol. 50, issue C, 177-186

Abstract: Empirical tests of the Nash bargaining solution (NBS, hereafter) are developed under different hypotheses about the behavior of disagreement utility levels.

Keywords: Testability; Nash bargaining; Revealed preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:50:y:2014:i:c:p:177-186

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.04.003

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