Roth–Postlewaite stability and von Neumann–Morgenstern stability

Ryo Kawasaki

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2015, vol. 58, issue C, 1-6

Abstract: In the framework of the indivisible goods market defined in Shapley and Scarf (1974), Roth and Postlewaite (1977) define an allocation to be (RP-)stable if no coalition of agents can benefit from a reallocation of goods after the allocation has been decided upon. In this paper, we show that the set of RP-stable allocations is the unique von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM-) stable set of the following domination relation: an allocation y dominates x if there is a coalition S that blocks x using allocation y in the market with x as its initial endowment. This connection between the two stability concepts also carries over for the indivisible goods market with multiple types of Konishi et al. (2001).

Keywords: Market with indivisibilities; RP-stable allocations; VNM-stable set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:58:y:2015:i:c:p:1-6

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.02.002

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