Stochastic stability in assignment problems

Bettina Klaus () and Jonathan Newton

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2016, vol. 62, issue C, 62-74

Abstract: In a dynamic model of assignment problems, it is shown that small deviations suffice to move between stable outcomes. This result is used to obtain no-selection and almost-no-selection results under the stochastic stability concept for uniform and payoff-dependent errors. There is no-selection of partner or payoff under uniform errors, nor for agents with multiple optimal partners under payoff-dependent errors. There can be selection of payoff for agents with a unique optimal partner under payoff-dependent errors. However, when every agent has a unique optimal partner, almost-no-selection is obtained.

Keywords: Assignment problem; (Core) stability; Decentralization; Stochastic stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems (2014)
Working Paper: Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:62:y:2016:i:c:p:62-74

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.11.002

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