Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule

Michel Le Breton, Dominique Lepelley and Hatem Smaoui

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2016, vol. 64, issue C, 11-22

Abstract: The main purpose of this paper is to estimate the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule for a class of random electorate models encompassing the celebrated Impartial Culture (IC) and Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) models. The emphasis is on the impact of correlation across votes on the order of magnitude of this event. Our proof techniques use arguments from probability theory on one hand and combinatorial and algorithmic tools for counting integer points inside convex polytopes on the other hand.

Keywords: Elections; Power measurement; Voting; Random electorate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule (2016)
Working Paper: Correlation, Partitioning and the Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote under the Majority Rule (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:64:y:2016:i:c:p:11-22

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.03.001

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