 Equivalence of the Aubin bargaining set and the set of competitive equilibria in a finite coalition production economyJiuqiang Liu Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2017, vol. 68, issue C, 55-61 Abstract: Mas-Colell (Mas-Colell, 1989) proved that the bargaining set and the set of competitive allocations coincide in an exchange economy with a continuum of traders under some standard assumptions. In the case of pure exchange economies with a finite number of traders it is well-known that the set of competitive allocations could be a strict subset of the core which can also be a strict subset of the bargaining set. In this paper, we show that the Aubin bargaining set (or fuzzy bargaining set) and the set of competitive allocations coincide in a finite coalition production economy under some standard assumptions. We also show that the (Mas-Colell) bargaining set shrinks to the set of competitive allocations in a finite coalition production economy E under some standard conditions when E is replicated. As a consequence, the existence of competitive equilibrium in a finite coalition production economy implies the nonemptiness of Aubin bargaining sets. Keywords: Bargaining sets; Cores; Competitive equilibrium; Coalition production economy; Exchange economy (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:68:y:2017:i:c:p:55-61 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.11.003 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Mathematical Economics is currently edited by Atsushi (A.) Kajii More articles in Journal of Mathematical Economics from Elsevier |
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