Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2017, vol. 71, issue C, 14-19

Abstract: We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption of coalitional sovereignty (C), meaning that a deviating coalition of players does not have the power to arrange the matches of agents outside the coalition. We study both the case of pairwise and coalitional deviations. We argue further that dominance has to be replaced by path dominance (P) along the lines of van Deemen (1991) and Page and Wooders (2009). This results in the pairwise CP vNM set in the case of pairwise deviations and the CP vNM set in the case of coalitional deviations. We obtain a unique prediction for both types of stable sets: the set of matchings that belong to the core.

Keywords: Matching problems; Stable sets; Enforceability; Coalitional sovereignty; Path dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Stable Sets in Matching Problems with Coalitional Sovereignty and Path Dominance (2016)
Working Paper: Stable Sets in Matching Problems with Coalitional Sovereignty and Path Dominance (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:71:y:2017:i:c:p:14-19

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.03.003

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