Some infinite-player generalizations of Scarf’s theorem: Finite-coalition α-cores and weak α-cores

Zhe Yang

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2017, vol. 73, issue C, 81-85

Abstract: In this paper, we first obtain some infinite-dimension versions of Scarf’s theorem. Second, we provide two generalizations of Scarf (1971) to normal-form games with infinitely many players. Under the assumptions analogous to Scarf (1971), we prove the nonemptiness of the finite-coalition α-core. Furthermore, by strengthening the assumptions, we obtain the nonemptiness of the weak α-core, and show that the weak α-core coincides with the closed-coalition α-core.

Keywords: (Weak) α-core; Infinitely many players; Existence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:73:y:2017:i:c:p:81-85

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.09.005

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