Bargaining sets in finite economies

Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Javier Hervés-Estévez and Emma Moreno-García

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2018, vol. 74, issue C, 93-98

Abstract: We provide a notion of bargaining set for a finite production economy based on a two-step veto mechanism à la Aubin (1979). We show that this bargaining set and the set of Walrasian allocations coincide. At the light of our result we refine Mas-Colell’s bargaining set for replicas of a finite economy. Our main result shows the persistence of Anderson et al.’s (1997) non-convergence of the bargaining sets to the set of Walrasian allocations. In addition, we analyze how the restriction on the formation of coalitions affects the bargaining set.

Keywords: Aubin’s veto; Bargaining sets; Coalitions; Core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:74:y:2018:i:c:p:93-98

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.11.008

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