Some generalizations of Kajii’s theorem to games with infinitely many players

Zhe Yang

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2018, vol. 76, issue C, 131-135

Abstract: In this paper, we first generalize Kajii’s (1992) result in Hausdorff topological vector spaces. Second, we prove the existence of the finite-coalition α−core for games with infinitely many players. Third, by strengthening some assumptions, we prove the nonemptiness of the weak α−core for games with infinitely many players, Finally, we also characterize the weak α−core by providing a coincidence of the weak α−core and the closed-coalition α−core.

Keywords: Weak α−core; Finite-coalition α−core; Infinitely many players; Existence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:76:y:2018:i:c:p:131-135

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.04.004

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