Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: A topological approach

James C.D. Fisher

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2020, vol. 91, issue C, 136-140

Abstract: In classic matching markets, individuals choose their partners and each pair chooses a contract from a finite set of feasible contracts; the existence of stable allocations then follows from the (generalized) Deferred Acceptance algorithm. We consider an extension where the contract set is a compact subset of a topological vector space (e.g., Rk or ℂ[0,1]) and give a simple topological argument, which leverages this classic algorithm, to establish the existence of stable allocations when payoffs are upper-semicontinuous.

Keywords: Deferred acceptance; Infinite contracts; Matching; Stability; Existence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:91:y:2020:i:c:p:136-140

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.09.005

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