Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information

Ritesh Jain and Michele Lombardi

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2022, vol. 99, issue C

Abstract: A social choice rule (SCR) is a mapping from preference profiles to lotteries over outcomes. When preference profiles are close to being common knowledge among players, an SCR is continuously virtually fully implementable if there exists a mechanism such that all its equilibrium outcomes are arbitrarily close to the outcomes recommended by the SCR. When there are at least three players and a domain condition is satisfied, we obtain the following result: any SCR is continuously virtually fully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibria, as well as in interim correlated rationalizable strategies, by a finite mechanism.

Keywords: Continuous implementation; Virtual implementation; Social choice rules; Uniform-weak topology; Common knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:99:y:2022:i:c:s0304406821001610

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102605

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