Weighted fair division with matroid-rank valuations: Monotonicity and strategyproofness

Warut Suksompong and Nicholas Teh

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2023, vol. 126, issue C, 48-59

Abstract: We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights corresponding to their entitlements. Previous work has shown that, when agents have binary additive valuations, the maximum weighted Nash welfare rule is resource-, population-, and weight-monotone, satisfies group-strategyproofness, and can be implemented in polynomial time. We generalize these results to the class of weighted additive welfarist rules with concave functions and agents with matroid-rank (also known as binary submodular) valuations.

Keywords: Fair division; Unequal entitlements; Matroid-rank valuations; Monotonicity; Strategyproofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:126:y:2023:i:c:p:48-59

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.09.004

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