Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects

Fuhito Kojima

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2009, vol. 57, issue 1, 134-142

Abstract: We consider random assignment of multiple indivisible objects. When each agent receives one object, [Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., 2001. A new solution to the random assignment problem. Journal of Economic Theory 100, 295-328] show that the probabilistic serial mechanism is ordinally efficient, envy-free and weakly strategy-proof. When each agent receives more than one object, we propose a generalized probabilistic serial mechanism that is ordinally efficient and envy-free but not weakly strategy-proof. Our main result shows that, if each agent receives more than one object, there exists no mechanism that is ordinally efficient, envy-free and weakly strategy-proof.

Keywords: Random; assignment; Multiple; object; assignment; Probabilistic; serial; mechanism; Ordinal; efficiency; Envy-freeness; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:57:y:2009:i:1:p:134-142

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