Implementation via mechanisms with transfers

Jianxin Yi

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2011, vol. 61, issue 1, 65-70

Abstract: We consider the following problem: suppose that the social choice rule is given, but the planner has the opportunity to redistribute among agents some numeraire commodity ("money") by compensatory transfers; can the planner find a transfer such that the social choice rule is Nash implementable by the transfer? In this paper, we establish a necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation by transfers. Furthermore, we construct a simplified mechanism, which Nash-implements the desired social choice rule by transfers.

Keywords: Nash; implementation; Monotonicity; Semi-monotonicity; Transfers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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