A general scoring rule

Wulf Gaertner and Yongsheng Xu

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2012, vol. 63, issue 3, 193-196

Abstract: This paper studies a ranking rule of the following type axiomatically: each voter places k candidates into n categories with ranks from n to 1 attached to these categories, the candidate(s) with the highest aggregate score is (are) the winner(s). We show that it is characterized by a monotonicity condition and a multi-stage cancellation property.

Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:63:y:2012:i:3:p:193-196

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.01.006

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