Efficient resource distribution in a minority game with a biased pool of strategies

K.F. Yip, P.M. Hui, T.S. Lo and N.F. Johnson

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2003, vol. 321, issue 1, 318-324

Abstract: The minority game (MG) is an agent-based model of a competing population with limited resources. We propose and study a modified model based on the MG in which the pool of strategies is biased, i.e., some strategies are more often picked by agents than others. It is found that the fluctuation in the number of agents making a particular choice over time is suppressed in the crowded phase of the MG when a bias is imposed. The suppressed fluctuation is related to the more effective formation of crowd and anticrowd. Accompanying the suppressed fluctuation is an enhanced success rate among the agents and thus a more efficient distribution of resources in a population of intrinsically selfish agents. The effect of biasing the strategies is also studied within the context of strategy-play among the agents.

Keywords: Agent-based models; Econophysics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:321:y:2003:i:1:p:318-324

DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4371(02)01795-8

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