Matching games with partial information

Paolo Laureti and Yi-Cheng Zhang

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2003, vol. 324, issue 1, 49-65

Abstract: We analyze different ways of pairing agents in a bipartite matching problem, with regard to its scaling properties and to the distribution of individual “satisfactions”. Then we explore the role of partial information and bounded rationality in a generalized Marriage Problem, comparing the benefits obtained by self-searching and by a matchmaker. Finally we propose a modified matching game intended to mimic the way consumers’ information makes firms to enhance the quality of their products in a competitive market.

Keywords: Matching Problems; Game theory; Bounded rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:324:y:2003:i:1:p:49-65

DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4371(02)01953-2

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