Effects of three-faced strategy on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma

Sinan Feng and Xuesong Liu

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2024, vol. 639, issue C

Abstract: Cooperative behavior can contribute to the development of society. Evolutionary game theory is a fundamental framework for studying cooperative behavior. This article explores the evolutionary dynamics of the three-faced strategy, which can demonstrate its different attribute behaviors according to different types of objects encountered by paying a certain role-switching cost. When three-faced individuals encounter cooperators, they will show defection behavior; when they interact with defectors, they will show punishment behavior; and when they meet the same kind, they will show cooperative behavior. The results show that the presence of three-faced individuals can effectively suppress defectors when the cost of role-switching is small or when the government gives relatively high incentives. Moreover, the moderate role-switching cost enhances the maintenance and emergence of cooperators. Additionally, as the system is in a stable state, which is full of three-faced individuals, the behavior displayed by the three-faced individuals at this time is consistent with that of the cooperators, which also promotes cooperative behavior in the population to some extent.

Keywords: Cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Social dilemma; Three-faced strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:639:y:2024:i:c:s0378437124001390

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2024.129631

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