 Group size and decision rules in legislative bargainingLuis Miller and Christoph Vanberg European Journal of Political Economy, 2015, vol. 37, issue C, 288-302 Abstract: We experimentally investigate the effects of group size on behavior and outcomes in a multilateral bargaining game. Using a Baron–Ferejohn protocol, our main interest is in the extent of costly delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement). We investigate the effects of group size on delay under both majority and unanimity rule. Under both decision rules, we find that proposals more often fail in larger groups, leading to increased delay. Consistent with prior research, we also find that unanimity rule leads to more delay than does majority rule, in both small and large groups. Contrary to one of our initial hypotheses, we find that the latter effect is not more pronounced in larger groups. The higher rate of failure in larger groups and under unanimity rule is driven by a combination of three factors: (1) a larger number of individuals must agree, (2) an important fraction of individuals reject offers below the equal share, and (3) proposers demand more (relative to the equal share) in large groups. Keywords: Legislative bargaining; Experiments; Group size; Majority rule; Unanimity rule (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:37:y:2015:i:c:p:288-302 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.09.005 Access Statistics for this article European Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by J. De Haan, A. L. Hillman and H. W. Ursprung More articles in European Journal of Political Economy from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.