Political turnover and the accumulation of democratic capital
Leyla D. Karakas
European Journal of Political Economy, 2016, vol. 44, issue C, 195-213
Abstract:
Certain democratic institutions tend to persist in some countries whereas they are frequently reversed in others. Focusing on strong constraints on executive power as one such institution, this paper theoretically studies the cross-country differences in the costs of relaxing these constraints. The model features two political parties that stochastically alternate in office according to a political uncertainty parameter. In each period, the incumbent can make reversible investments into the future government's ability to reform executive constraints. The main results indicate that more competitive elections and higher degrees of policy polarization between the political parties lead to high and persistent levels of investment into the society's stock of “democratic capital”. These higher costs of institutional reform in turn result in durable strong executive constraint-regimes.
Keywords: Endogenous political institutions; Executive constraints; Institutional Reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D78 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:44:y:2016:i:c:p:195-213
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.07.007
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