Strategic alliances in a veto game: An experimental study

Chulyoung Kim, Sang-Hyun Kim, Jinhyuk Lee and Joosung Lee

European Journal of Political Economy, 2022, vol. 75, issue C

Abstract: In a veto game, we investigate the effects of “buyout” which allows non-veto players strategically form an intermediate coalition. First, our experimental findings show that the proportion of intermediate coalition formation is much lower than predicted by theory, regardless of the relative negotiation power between veto and non-veto players. Second, allowing coalition formation among non-veto players does not affect the surplus distribution between veto and non-veto players, which diverges from core allocations. These findings contrast to the literature, which views the ability to form an intermediate coalition as a valuable asset for non-veto players in increasing their bargaining power.

Keywords: Game theory; Coalition bargaining; Veto game; Experiment; Non-core allocation; Intermediate coalition formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 C92 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268022000349
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:75:y:2022:i:c:s0176268022000349

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102219

Access Statistics for this article

European Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by J. De Haan, A. L. Hillman and H. W. Ursprung

More articles in European Journal of Political Economy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().