Politically influenced counterterrorism policy and welfare efficiency

Subhayu Bandyopadhyay and Todd Sandler

European Journal of Political Economy, 2023, vol. 76, issue C

Abstract: The paper examines how two targeted countries strategically deploy their counterterror forces when lobbying defense firms influence counterterror provision. For proactive measures, lobbying activities in a single targeted country lessen underprovision, raise overall counterterrorism, and reduce terrorism. Welfare decreases in the lobbied country but increases in the other targeted country owing to enhanced free riding. Lobbying influence on the targeted countries' welfare is tied to terrorists' targeting preferences and how the lobbied government weighs citizens’ welfare. Lobbying in both targeted countries may result in the first-best equilibrium. International policy coordination may lead to less efficient outcomes than the noncooperative equilibrium.

Keywords: Proactive counterterror and lobbying; Drones; Unilateral Nash equilibrium; Politically influenced Nash equilibrium; Welfare efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H23 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268022000581
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Politically influenced counterterrorism policy and welfare efficiency (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:76:y:2023:i:c:s0176268022000581

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102250

Access Statistics for this article

European Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by J. De Haan, A. L. Hillman and H. W. Ursprung

More articles in European Journal of Political Economy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().