 Corruption, scandals and incompetence: Do voters care?Harm Rienks European Journal of Political Economy, 2023, vol. 79, issue C Abstract: Accountability theory posits that elections weed out badly performing politicians, whereas type-selection theory posits that politicians who do not represent a (sufficiently large) group are ousted. This paper tests this by estimating the impact of various forms of misconduct by Dutch local government politicians on the vote share of their parties. It shows that incidents that reveal incompetence cost their parties 1.5 percentage points of the vote share, or roughly 10 percent of their voters. Incidents that expose politicians to be someone else than their public image suggests (i.e., scandals) have a similar cost. Incidents that reveal both simultaneously (i.e., corruption) cost parties almost double, namely 3 percentage points. The results show that the accountability and type-selection theories are both important in explaining voting behavior and suggest that there might be additional punishment when both theories predict a negative effect. Keywords: Corruption; Voting; Electoral accountability; Type-selection; Differences-in-differences (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:79:y:2023:i:c:s017626802300085x DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2023.102441 Access Statistics for this article European Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by J. De Haan, A. L. Hillman and H. W. Ursprung More articles in European Journal of Political Economy from Elsevier |
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