Transitive delegation in social networks: Theory and experiment

Sang-Hyun Kim

European Journal of Political Economy, 2024, vol. 82, issue C

Abstract: This paper presents a model of delegative democracy, wherein each voter has the choice to either directly vote or delegate their vote, along with any votes delegated to them, to another voter. I examine the incentives for delegation and how this affects the quality of collective decision-making. Specifically, by assuming the delegation network to be a ring network, I analyze symmetric Nash equilibria both with and without the delegation option. A key finding is that when the delegation network is sufficiently ideologically homogeneous and large, voters are inclined to delegate their votes, even in situations where they lack knowledge about who knows what or who knows whom. Furthermore, I demonstrate that delegation facilitates improved collective decision-making. Theoretical predictions are corroborated by laboratory data.

Keywords: Voting; Delegation; Democracy; Delegative democracy; Information aggregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:82:y:2024:i:c:s0176268024000338

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102531

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