A comparative analysis of greening policies across supply chain structures
Debabrata Ghosh and
Janat Shah
International Journal of Production Economics, 2012, vol. 135, issue 2, 568-583
Abstract:
In this paper, we examine an apparel serial supply chain whose players initiate product “greening.” We consider situations in which the players cooperate or act individually. Our problem is motivated by recent developments in the supply chains of global apparel players. We build game theoretic models and show how greening levels, prices and profits are influenced by channel structures. We also study the impact of greening costs and consumer sensitivity towards green apparels. We propose a two-part tariff contract to coordinate the green channel. Our key contribution lies in the model of decision making of various supply chain structures and analyzing its impact on the players and supply chain. The problem throws interesting insights into the strategies of apparel players and their key decisions.
Keywords: Apparel industry; Green supply chains; Channel coordination; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:proeco:v:135:y:2012:i:2:p:568-583
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2011.05.027
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