 Optimal decisions in a retailer Stackelberg supply chainXi Chen, Hui Zhang, Michael Zhang and Jing Chen International Journal of Production Economics, 2017, vol. 187, issue C, 260-270 Abstract: In the context of a retailer Stackelberg supply chain, we examine how a direct channel added by a manufacturer can influence the decisions of the retailer and the manufacturer, and the impact it will have on their profits. We obtain equilibrium prices for a retailer Stackelberg dual-channel supply chain. We find that, as compared to a single retail channel supply chain, a dual-channel supply chain can enhance the profits of the manufacturer and the supply chain. The retailer, however, will benefit from the direct channel when the maximum sales in the retail channel are high. We further propose a retailer's margin contract that can coordinate the dual-channel supply chain and ensure that both the retailer and the manufacturer will be more profitable. The implications of the coordination are also discussed. Numerical examples are included to illustrate the major results of the paper. Keywords: Retailer Stackelberg game; Supply chain dual-channel; Channel competition (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:proeco:v:187:y:2017:i:c:p:260-270 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2017.03.002 Access Statistics for this article International Journal of Production Economics is currently edited by Stefan Minner More articles in International Journal of Production Economics from Elsevier |
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