Do norms on contribution behavior affect intrinsic motivation? Field-experimental evidence from Germany
Pierre Boyer,
Nadja Dwenger and
Johannes Rincke ()
Journal of Public Economics, 2016, vol. 144, issue C, 140-153
Abstract:
This paper studies how imposing norms on contribution behavior affects individuals' intrinsic motivation. We consider the church levy, which the Catholic Church in Germany collects as a charitable donation, despite the fact that the levy is legally a tax. We design a randomized field experiment with treatments informing individuals that the levy is a tax. We demonstrate that treatment effects differ across motivational types. Among weakly intrinsically motivated individuals, communicating the legal norm results in a significant crowd-out of intrinsic motivation. In contrast, strongly intrinsically motivated individuals do not show any treatment response.
Keywords: Intrinsic motivation; Crowding out; Charitable giving; Norms; Taxes; Public goods; Randomized field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D03 H26 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)
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Working Paper: Do Norms on Contribution Behavior Affect Intrinsic Motivation? Field-Experimental Evidence from Germany (2016) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:144:y:2016:i:c:p:140-153
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.10.003
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