The right type of legislator: A theory of taxation and representation

Andrea Mattozzi and Erik Snowberg

Journal of Public Economics, 2018, vol. 159, issue C, 54-65

Abstract: We develop a theory of taxation and the distribution of government spending in a citizen-candidate model of legislatures. Individuals are heterogeneous in two dimensions: productive ability in the private sector and negotiating ability in politics. When these are positively correlated, rich voters always prefer a rich legislator, but poor voters face a trade-off. A rich legislator will secure more pork for the district, but will also prefer lower taxation than the poor voter. Our theory organizes a number of stylized facts across countries about taxation and redistribution, parties, and class representation in legislatures. We demonstrate that spending does not necessarily increase when the number of legislators increases, as the standard common-pool intuition suggests, and that many policies aimed at increasing descriptive representation may have the opposite effect.

Keywords: Citizen candidates; Taxation; Redistribution; Representation; Legislatures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H10 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Right Type of Legislator: A Theory of Taxation and Representation (2018)
Working Paper: The Right Type of Legislator: a Theory of Taxation and Representation (2017)
Working Paper: The Right Type of Legislator: A Theory of Taxation and Representation (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:159:y:2018:i:c:p:54-65

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.01.009

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