Information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation: A laboratory experiment

Helios Herrera, Aniol Llorente-Saguer and Joseph McMurray ()

Journal of Public Economics, 2019, vol. 179, issue C

Abstract: This paper documents a laboratory experiment that analyzes voter participation in common interest proportional representation (PR) elections, comparing this with majority rule. Consistent with theoretical predictions, poorly informed voters in either system abstain from voting, thereby shifting weight to those who are better informed. A dilution problem makes mistakes especially costly under PR, so abstention is higher in PR in contrast with private interest environments, and welfare is lower. Deviations from Nash equilibrium predictions can be accommodated by a logit version of quantal response equilibrium (QRE), which allows for voter mistakes.

Keywords: Turnout; Information aggregation; Proportional Representation; Majority Rule; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Information Aggregation and Turnout in Proportional Representation: A Laboratory Experiment (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:179:y:2019:i:c:s0047272719301124

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104051

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