 Leaving benefits on the table: Evidence from SNAPJournal of Public Economics, 2019, vol. 179, issue C Abstract: Many social insurance programs require that beneficiaries periodically re-verify eligibility, allowing officials to identify ineligible applicants but risking the loss of eligible applicants who do not complete these requirements. While many states have invested in simplified verification procedures to reduce that risk, the extent of exit among eligible beneficiaries and the efficacy of these simplifications is not well established. This paper uses administrative data from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) to establish three facts. First, retention in SNAP is low, with approximately one-half of entering cases leaving in the first year. Second, qualitative evidence and quantitative simulations suggest that approximately half of those who exit in the first year remain eligible. Third, using the staggered roll-out of an online case management tool in Michigan, I find that this simplification reduced the rate of long-term exit at key verification dates by almost 2pp (12%). These facts suggest that eligible retention is very incomplete, and that ongoing simplification efforts increase retention among eligible beneficiaries. Keywords: Social insurance; Food assistance; Program take up; Public finance (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:179:y:2019:i:c:s004727271930115x DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104054 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Public Economics is currently edited by R. Boadway and J. Poterba More articles in Journal of Public Economics from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.