Teacher accountability reforms and the supply and quality of new teachers

Matthew Kraft, Eric J. Brunner, Shaun M. Dougherty and David J. Schwegman

Journal of Public Economics, 2020, vol. 188, issue C

Abstract: In recent years, states have sought to increase accountability for public school teachers by implementing a package of reforms centered on high-stakes evaluation systems. We examine the effect of these reforms on the supply and quality of new teachers. Leveraging variation across states and time, we find that accountability reforms reduced the number of newly licensed teacher candidates and increased the likelihood of unfilled teaching positions, particularly in hard-to-staff schools. Evidence also suggests that reforms increased the quality of newly hired teachers by reducing the likelihood new teachers attended unselective undergraduate institutions. Decreases in job security, satisfaction, and autonomy are likely mechanisms for these effects.

Keywords: Teacher supply; Teacher evaluation; Teacher quality; Education; Teacher hiring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I21 I28 J22 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:188:y:2020:i:c:s0047272720300761

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104212

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