Cross-border tax evasion after the common reporting standard: Game over?

Elisa Casi-Eberhard, Christoph Spengel and Barbara M.B. Stage

Journal of Public Economics, 2020, vol. 190, issue C

Abstract: We study the short-term effect of the first global multilateral standard for the automatic exchange of information (AEOI), the so-called Common Reporting Standard (CRS), on cross-border tax evasion. Employing newly available bilateral data on cross-border deposits, we find that the CRS induced a reduction of 11.5% in cross-border deposits parked in tax havens. However, despite the 4000 bilateral information exchange relations created under the CRS, deposit relocation is still an option for secrecy-seeker. We find that the United States, which did not commit to the CRS, emerges as an attractive location for cross-border deposits.

Keywords: Tax evasion; Automatic exchange of information; Tax havens; Cross-border deposits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F42 G21 H26 H31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:190:y:2020:i:c:s0047272720301043

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104240

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