 My (running) mate, the mayor: Political ties and access to public sector jobs in EcuadorPablo Brassiolo, Ricardo Estrada and Gustavo Fajardo Journal of Public Economics, 2020, vol. 191, issue C Abstract: We show that local politicians' probability of being employed by a municipality increases when they have a strong party connection to its mayor. Using a regression discontinuity design, we compare the employment outcomes of individuals connected to the winner vis-à-vis those connected to the runner-up in close mayoral races in Ecuador. Among candidates to local councils who lose their bid, the probability of getting a job in the municipality increases tenfold when their own party's mayoral nominee is elected. The effect is very strong for low-ranking positions, which suggests that it is the result of political patronage. Three additional results shed light on where patronage is more likely to emerge. First, the effect is stronger in poorer municipalities, where public sector jobs are more valuable. Second, benefits go largely to politicians better positioned within the party structure. Third, the effect is concentrated among younger mayors, who have a longer career ahead of them to capitalize clientelist arrangements. Keywords: Bureaucracy; Close elections; Patronage; Public sector employment (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:191:y:2020:i:c:s004727272030150x DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104286 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Public Economics is currently edited by R. Boadway and J. Poterba More articles in Journal of Public Economics from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.