False alarm? Estimating the marginal value of health signals

Toshiaki Iizuka, Katsuhiko Nishiyama, Brian Chen and Karen Eggleston

Journal of Public Economics, 2021, vol. 195, issue C

Abstract: We investigate the marginal value of information in the context of health signals that people receive after checkups. Although underlying health status is similar for individuals just below and above a clinical threshold, treatments differ according to the checkup signals they receive. For the general population, whereas health warnings about diabetes increase healthcare utilization, health outcomes do not improve. However, among high-risk individuals, outcomes do improve, and improved health is worth its cost. These results indicate that the marginal value of health information depends on setting appropriate thresholds for health warnings and targeting individuals most likely to benefit from follow-up medical care.

Keywords: Health; Signals; Information; Value; Prevention; Diabetes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Working Paper: False Alarm? Estimating the Marginal Value of Health Signals (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:195:y:2021:i:c:s0047272721000049

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104368

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