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Incumbents’ performance and political extremism

Marina Dodlova and Galina Zudenkova ()

Journal of Public Economics, 2021, vol. 201, issue C

Abstract: This paper studies the relationship between incumbents’ performance and political extremism, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a spatial model of political competition in which voters use the incumbent’s performance in office to update their beliefs about his competence. A better performance leads to the incumbent’s electoral advantage and so allows him to announce a more extreme platform closer to his bliss point. His challenger, in turn, faces electoral disadvantage and so announces a more moderate platform in order to compensate for it. To test these predictions, we use the data on incumbents’ performance in natural disaster relief and ideological positions of the candidates in the U.S. House of Representatives elections for the time period 2000–2012. The empirical evidence shows that a better performance in post-disaster recovery is associated with more extreme ideological positions of the corresponding incumbents and more moderate ideological positions of their challengers. These and other empirical results are in line with the model predictions.

Keywords: Political extremism; Incumbents’ performance; Spatial competition; Natural disasters (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H84 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:201:y:2021:i:c:s0047272721001092

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104473

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