Informative fundraising: The signaling value of seed money and matching gifts

Silvana Krasteva and Piruz Saboury

Journal of Public Economics, 2021, vol. 203, issue C

Abstract: While existing theory predicts that matching leadership gifts raise more voluntary contributions for public goods than seed money, recent field experiments find otherwise. We reconcile the two by studying a model of leadership giving with incomplete information about the quality of the public good provided by a charity. Both the fundraising scheme employed by the charity and the contribution decision by the lead donor may signal the charity’s quality to subsequent donors. The charity solicits optimally for a matching gift if the lead donor is informed about the quality of the public good. Intuitively, an informed lead donor conveys quality information to downstream donors through the size of her contribution. As a result, the charity has no signaling concerns and opts for matching because of its ability to mitigate free-riding. The preference for matching, however, reduces when the lead donor’s information is limited. Then, the lead donor’s contribution is less informative and the high quality charity uses seed money as a costly signal of quality. As a result, seed money is associated with higher expected quality and higher expected contributions compared to matching.

Keywords: Fundraising; Charity’s quality; Matching gift; Seed money; Information acquisition; Quality singling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H00 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:203:y:2021:i:c:s0047272721001377

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104501

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