Workplace disruptions, judge caseloads, and judge decisions: Evidence from SSA judicial corps retirements

Clayson Shumway and Riley Wilson

Journal of Public Economics, 2022, vol. 205, issue C

Abstract: We exploit judge retirements from the Social Security Disability Insurance judicial corps to document how remaining judges respond to workplace disruptions. When a peer judge retires, the remaining judges see a 5 percent increase in dispositions and decisions that lasts 6 months. Institutional features of the disability appeal process allow us to estimate what happens to judge decisions when caseloads increase, holding the composition of cases fixed. Increased caseloads are accompanied by a 1 percent decrease in the judges’ share of favorable decisions, suggesting 16,600 claimants in-sample were not awarded disability insurance who would have been, absent the workplace disruption.

Keywords: Social Security Disability; Judges; Peer Effects; Caseloads (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H55 J14 K23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:205:y:2022:i:c:s0047272721002097

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104573

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