Social norms, sanctions, and conditional entry in markets with externalities: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment

Tobias Riehm, Nicolas Fugger, Philippe Gillen, Vitali Gretschko and Peter Werner

Journal of Public Economics, 2022, vol. 212, issue C

Abstract: In an artefactual field experiment with a large and heterogeneous population sample, we test the implications of social norms for market interactions associated with negative real-world externalities. We run large stylized markets in which sellers and buyers decide whether to enter the market and how much to bid for experimental coupons. Trading leads to profits for sellers and buyers but at the same time destroys donations for a good cause.

Keywords: Markets; Moral behavior; Negative externalities; Social norms; Punishment; Large population sample; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D01 D62 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:212:y:2022:i:c:s0047272722001037

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104701

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