Doctor switching costs

Gordon Dahl and Silke Forbes

Journal of Public Economics, 2023, vol. 221, issue C

Abstract: We exploit a quasi-random health insurance experiment which for some employees increased the price to keep their doctors between $600 to $1900 per year, while holding all other insurance plan characteristics constant. Our setting allows us to identify doctor switching costs separately from inattention, option value and other characteristics. Forty-six percent of individuals are willing to pay the higher premiums to keep their doctors, and these doctor switching costs account for the largest share of inertia in plan choice. Our findings imply that older and sicker individuals would be more negatively impacted by reforms which restrict access to doctors.

Keywords: Choice frictions; Health insurance; Switching costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:221:y:2023:i:c:s0047272723000403

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104858

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