With a little help from my friends. Political competition in the shadow of organized crime
Pasquale Accardo,
Giuseppe De Feo and
Giacomo De Luca
Journal of Public Economics, 2023, vol. 227, issue C
Abstract:
Higher electoral competition may reinforce the position of politically active criminal organizations, which can endorse politicians in exchange for favors. This paper formalizes this intuition and test it on Italian electoral data, using the 1991 electoral reform as an exogenous source of variation in electoral competition in one of the two branches of the Parliament. Our triple-difference estimates suggest that after the reform mafia-prone areas reported higher vote shares awarded to the party traditionally supported by criminal organizations only for the branch affected by the reform, and a larger dispersion of votes across candidates of the same party.
Keywords: Political competition; Organized crime (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:227:y:2023:i:c:s0047272723001809
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104998
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