Dynamic electoral competition with voter loss-aversion and imperfect recall

Ben Lockwood, Minh Le and James Rockey

Journal of Public Economics, 2024, vol. 232, issue C

Abstract: This paper explores the implications of voter loss-aversion and imperfect recall for the dynamics of electoral competition in a simple Downsian model of repeated elections. The interplay between the median voter’s reference point and political parties’ choice of platforms generates a dynamic process of (de)polarization, following an initial shift in party ideology. This is consistent with the gradual nature of long-term trends in polarization in the US Congress.

Keywords: Electoral competition; Repeated elections; Loss-aversion; Imperfect recall; Polarization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:232:y:2024:i:c:s0047272724000082

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105072

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