Family control, external governance mechanisms, and dividend payouts

Chia-Chen Teng, Shaomin Li and J. Jimmy Yang

The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 2021, vol. 79, issue C, 198-209

Abstract: This paper examines the ways in which three external governance mechanisms, namely market preferences, institutional investors, and debtholder monitoring, influence dividend payout decisions under a family-governance system. We find that family firms issue lower dividends when the dividend premium is high in the market. Institutional investors and family-controlled governance mechanisms interact to increase dividend payouts. Family firms under greater debtholder monitoring pay out more cash to shareholders. Our findings generate important policy implications.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Dividend payout; Debtholder; Institutional investors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G02 G34 G35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:79:y:2021:i:c:p:198-209

DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2020.05.012

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