Trade policy in markets with collusion: The case of North–South R&D spillovers

Jan Boone and Kresimir Zigic ()

Research in Economics, 2015, vol. 69, issue 2, 224-237

Abstract: It is well known that unilateral R&D spillovers hamper domestic firms׳ incentives to invest in innovations and thus have likely adverse effects for domestic welfare. However, when tacit collusion between foreign and domestic firms is likely, R&D spillovers may encourage monopoly pricing and therefore may have an additional detrimental impact on domestic welfare, especially on consumer surplus. Tariff protection could address this problem by altering firms׳ cost efficiency distribution and, thus, by inducing tougher market competition. Consumers benefit from the tariff policy, and governments that assign a high enough weight to the consumer surplus set positive tariff levels. Under protection domestic firms׳ innovation level remains the same as under free trade but the average industry efficiency increases.

Keywords: R&D spillovers; Tariff protection; Supergames; Cost asymmetries; Leadership; Tacit collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:69:y:2015:i:2:p:224-237

DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2015.02.006

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