Political geography and income inequalities

Filippo Gregorini

Research in Economics, 2015, vol. 69, issue 3, 439-452

Abstract: We analyze political geography and the size of governments in the presence of income inequality. The social planner solution implies that income inequality is neutral on the size of countries but reduces the optimal provision of public goods within each country. Under additional conditions, a politico-economic equilibrium geography is characterized by suboptimal size of nations, but there may not be a stable equilibrium when inequality is high enough. Finally, we introduce globalization showing that inequality can increase the size of countries, reduce public good provision and, at the same time, decrease their degree of openness.

Keywords: Jurisdiction size; Public spending; Globalization; Income; Distribution; Tax Distortion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:69:y:2015:i:3:p:439-452

DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2015.06.001

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